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GILES V. CALIFORNIA: A PERSONAL REFLECTION
by
RichardD. Friedman
In this Essay, Professor Friedman places Giles v. California in the
context of the recent transformation of the law governing the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. He contends that a
robust doctrine offorfeiture is an integralpart of a sound conception of
the confrontation right. One reason this is so is that cases fitting within
the traditionalhearsay exception for dying declarations can be explained
as instances of forfeiture. This explanation leads to a simple structure of
confrontation law, qualified by the principle that the confrontation right
may be waived or forfeited but not subject to genuine exceptions. But this
view of forfeiture now appears to be foreclosed by the decision in Giles
that the accused does not forfeit the right unless his conduct was designed
to render the victim unavailable as a witness. One justification offered
for the result in Giles is the near circularity of holding that the accused
forfeited the confrontationright on the basis of the same misconduct with
which he is charged. This coincidence of issues should not be regarded as
a genuine problem-any more than when, in a conspiracy prosecution,
the judge admits a statement on the ground that it was made by a
conspirator of the accused. Another justification offered by the majority
was equity-an unpersuasive ground when the reason the accused
cannot examine the witness is that he murdered her, albeit for some
reason other than preventing her testimony at trial. And finally, the
majority contends that the imminence requirement of the dying
declarationexception would have been without force ifforfeiture doctrine
had been broad enough to apply to cases of statements by victims who did
not appear to be on the verge of death at the time. Professor Friedman
contends that the imminence requirement can be understood as marking
the boundary of cases in which the prosecution has a duty of
mitigation-that is, a duty to try to preserve so much of the
confrontation right as reasonably possible given the situation created by
the accused's misconduct. He also argues that over the long term the
decision in Giles may turn out to weaken the Confrontation Clause-by
encouraging manipulation of existing doctrine, by discouraging
adoption of a doctrine of mitigation, and by complicatingthe structure of
the confrontationright.

Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This
essay is adapted from a presentation made at Lewis & Clark Law School on January
30, 2009.
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In Giles v. California,' the Supreme Court severely restricted the
doctrine under which a criminal defendant may forfeit the right
accorded him, under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
of the Constitution, "to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 2
This essay presents a personal reflection on Giles. Some of what I say will
be self-referential. I recognize the potential hubris in this, and I
apologize in advance. But I have been thinking about, and engaged in,
issues related to the Confrontation Clause for many years now, and this
approach will allow me to set the Giles case in context and show why I
believe it to be a very unfortunate development.
Some years ago, I became convinced that the then-prevailing
doctrine of the Confrontation Clause, as developed under Ohio v. Roberts,
was in serious disrepair.3 The primary problem was that the doctrine,
based on the supposed reliability of an offered statement, did not express
a principle worthy of respect. Another problem was that the limitations
on the right, based in large part on "firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions,
were such poor guides to reliability.4 A favorite target of mine was the
exception for dying declarations. Because the gates of heaven were
opening when the declarant made such a statement, it was supposedly
extremely reliable-no one would want to die "with a lie upon his lips. 2' I
suspected that if I were in that position, I might have a very different
response, that I might as well take advantage of the opportunity to settle
an old score without suffering any adverse earthly consequence. The
idea, endorsed by the Supreme Court in 1990 in Idaho v. Wright, that
dying declarations were so reliable that cross-examination would be of
"marginal utility," struck me as particularly silly. Suppose defense
counsel in a murder case were given a special opportunity, a one-day visa
to heaven (or wherever) to take the deposition of the deceased murder
victim. Would counsel really say, "No sense going. She knew she was on
death's door when she accused my client, so I couldn't do anything with
her on cross." Not very likely. Even if counsel believed that the dying
declarant's sincerity was beyond challenge, the declarant often is not in a
particularly good position to observe the assailant. And if the opening of
the gates of heaven did operate as a virtual guarantee of truthfulness, why
was the exception limited to statements made about the apparently

2

128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

448 U.S. 56 (1980).
Id. at 66.
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (quoting Regina v. Osman, 15 Cox
Crim. Cas. 1, 3 (N. Wales Cir. 1881)(Lush, L.J.)("[N]o person, who is immediately
going into the presence of his Maker, will do so with a lie upon his lips.").
Wright, 497 U.S. at 820.
7 See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 737 N.W.2d 790 (Mich. Ct. Apps. 2007), leave to appeal
granted, 741 N.W.2d 24 (2007), and order grantingleave vacated, 752 N.W.2d 454 (2008)
(allowing statement made by dying victim shot from outside bedroom window while
in bed at night).
5
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impending death, and so for practical purposes to statements by
homicide victims -why was it not applicable to any statement made by a
person who knows she is on the edge of death?
I began to argue that the confrontation right, instead of
presumptively applying to all hearsay statements, should be limited to
those made in anticipation of investigation or prosecution of a crime.
After a time, I came to believe that a sound historical and theoretical
justification for this limitation was that such statements-and only such
statements-are testimonial in nature, and that the Confrontation
Clause, which applies "[i]n all criminal prosecutions" to "the witnesses
against" the accused, extends to, and is limited to, testimonial
statements; 9 testifying is what witnesses do. But as to testimonial
statements, the Clause should be understood to articulate not merely a
presumptive evidentiary rule but an absolute, categorical procedural
right: Testimony may not be introduced against an accused unless he has
had an opportunity to be confronted with and cross-examine the witness.
(A historically supported subsidiary rule is that this opportunity must be
afforded at trial unless that is not reasonably possible.) This right is
absolute in the same way that its neighbors in the Sixth Amendment, the
right to a jury trial and the right to counsel, are absolute: We do not
decide in a particular case that the accused is so obviously guilty that it is
silly or counterproductive to afford him counsel or ajury trial.
So I began trumpeting a theory of the Confrontation Clause as an
absolute right, without exceptions.' But I was brought up short on one
point, first by a student whose name I am afraid I cannot remember.
When I ridiculed the dying declaration exception, suggesting that these
statements should be excluded, he objected-if the defendant murdered
the victim then wouldn't it be outrageous for the statement to be
excluded on the basis that he had not had a chance to cross-examine
her? I suppose I was slow to grasp the point because my former colleague
Stewart Sterk later made it to me as well.
And they were right. I learned from them that, whatever the
justification, one way or another most statements fitting within the
traditional hearsay exception for dying declarations are going to be
admitted. And I recognized that they had pointed to a very sound
justification for admitting these statements that did not rely on the
nonsense of the traditional exception for dying declarations. Under a
longstanding doctrine that has come to be known as forfeiture, in at least
some settings (I do not want to beg the question) if the accused renders a
witness unavailable by wrongful means then the lack of an opportunity
' See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (2) (limiting exception to certain statements
"concerning the cause or circumstances of what the declarant believed to be
impending death").
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

'9 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for First Principles, 86
GEO.LJ.1011 (1998).
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for the accused to be confronted with the witness will not prevent the
witness's testimonial statements from being admitted." Intimidation,
especially in the domestic violence context, and murder are the types of
misconduct that most often justify a conclusion of forfeiture. I was
reminded of the standard definition of chutzpah-the quality illustrated
by the man who killed both his parents and then begged the court for
mercy as an orphan. It seemed to me, and it still does, that nearly as
flagrant an illustration of chutzpah is provided by the man who kills his
victim and then contends that her statement made on the verge of death
cannot be introduced against him because he did not have a chance to
cross-examine her. 2 "Let me get this straight," I imagine the trial judge
asking, "You're complaining that you didn't get a chance to crossexamine her, right? But the reason you didn't was that you murdered
her, right?"
Of course, the conclusion that the admissibility of a dying
declaration could be explained on the basis of forfeiture depends on the
premise that in fact the accused murdered the victim-and that is
precisely the proposition that the prosecution is attempting to prove to
the jury. Some people are disturbed by the appearance of circularity but
it really isn't a problem at all. To secure a conviction, the prosecution
must prove to the trier of fact (a jury if there is one) that the defendant
committed the crime. As a separate matter, to justify the admission of a
given piece of evidence, the prosecution must prove to the judge that the
defendant committed misconduct rendering the witness unavailable. It
so happens that the two acts are the same, but so what? The two factfinding processes are held for different purposes, presumably before
different fact-finders, on different bodies of evidence, and subject to
different standards of persuasion. If the judge decides that in fact the
accused did commit the forfeiting misconduct, she may simply admit the
evidence but she need not announce her factual conclusion to the jury.
The situation is exactly comparable to the one that has prevailed for
many years with respect to conspiracy cases in which the prosecution
that it was made in furtherance of
seeks to admit evidence on the basis
3
the very conspiracy being charged.1
If forfeiture doctrine accounts for the traditional receptivity to dying
declarations, then a smooth, simple theory is possible. In the amicus brief
I submitted in Crawford v. Washington,'4 1 wrote:
Like the right to counsel and the right to ajury trial, the right to
confront witnesses is subject to waiver, and it is also subject to
forfeiture, for the accused has no ground to complain if his own
wrongdoing caused his inability to confront the witness. Like those
" See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 151-152 (1878).
12

See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISR.

L. REv. 506 (1997).
, See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987).
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
HeinOnline -- 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 736 2009
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other rights, the right to confront adverse witnesses can and should
be applied unequivocally. That is, if the statement is a testimonial
one and the right has not been waived or forfeited, then the right
should apply without exceptions. 5
Crawford, of course, transformed the law governing confrontation.
Justice Scalia has identified Crawford as his favorite among his opinions,
and it is a good choice.16 The decision is a monumental achievement,
practically a re-institution of the confrontation right as a central feature
of our criminal justice system. Crawford spoke in strong, categorical
terms. It indicated appropriately that the primary focus of the
Confrontation Clause is on testimonial statements; subsequently, the
Court has, quite properly, declared explicitly that the Clause does not
extend beyond such statements. As to testimonial statements, Crawford
made clear that there is a flat right to confrontation, and no judicial
assessment that the statement is reliable will suffice as a replacement.
Any exceptions? The Court pointed to two. It endorsed the doctrine
of forfeiture by wrongdoing, without elaboration other than to note that
the doctrine is based on "essentially equitable grounds" rather than on
an assessment of reliability. 17 It would have been better if the Court
referred to forfeiture as a qualification on the exercise of the
confrontation right, a circumstance estopping the accused from asserting
the right, rather than as an exception to it. I don't think the doctrine that
a right might be waived should be considered an exception to the right. I
believe the same is true of estoppel by forfeiture, but we should not put
too much weight on terminology.
Second, the Court correctly noted that the only exception to the
hearsay rule that was (1) generally articulated on the basis of reliability
concerns, (2) widely recognized at the time the Sixth Amendment was
adopted, and (3) applied broadly to testimonial statements introduced
against an accused was the one for dying declarations. The Court was very
careful in its treatment of this exception, saying, "We need not decide in
this case whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for
testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must be accepted on
historical grounds, it is sui generis."1 8
So matters stood pretty well. The Court had recognized the existence
of forfeiture doctrine, and it had not committed itself to the existence of
a dying declaration exception to the confrontation right as such.

'5 Motion for Leave to File and Brief Amicus Curiae of Law Professors ShermanJ.
Clark, et al., in Support of Petitioner, at 3, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004) (No. 02-9410).
" JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE 317 (2007). Toobin speaks only of "an esoteric case
interpreting the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment," but the reference
seems obvious, though Crawford seems esoteric only as judged by a standard of
headline generation.
17 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
" Id. at 56 n.6.

HeinOnline -- 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 737 2009

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:3

Forfeiture played a more salient role in the Court's next encounter
with the confrontation right, in the pair of cases decided under the name
Davis v. Washington.'9 These were both domestic violence cases in which
the question was whether an accusation made to an agent of law
enforcement shortly after the alleged incident was testimonial. I
represented the accused in one of the cases, Hammon v. Indiana." Amy
Hammon made her accusation to a police officer in her living room, an
indeterminate time after the alleged assault, while another officer kept
her husband at bay. Immediately after the oral accusation, she signed an
affidavit to similar effect.21 If her accusations were not deemed
testimonial, it would have been not only an evisceration of Crawford, but
the virtual death of the confrontation right: a prosecution witness could
testify simply by speaking to a police officer in her living room. But fiftyeight organizations active against domestic violence appeared as amici on
the side of the states. Much of their emphasis was on the detrimental
impact on domestic violence prosecutions if statements like this were not
admitted, in large part because domestic violence victims so often decline
22
to testify because of intimidation. In reply, I argued: "[I]f wrongful
conduct of the accused causes the complainant to be unable to testify,
then the accused should be held to have forfeited the confrontation
right.... Petitioner believes that a robust doctrine
of forfeiture is an
23
integral part of a sound conception of the right.
In resolving the Hammon case, the Court took the proper basic
approach. While noting the fact that domestic violence "is notoriously
susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she
does not testify at trial," the Court declined to "vitiate" the constitutional
24
guarantee of confrontation by interpreting it too narrowly. But, the
Court emphasized, the doctrine of forfeiture was available to protect "the
integrity of the criminal-trial system. 2 5
The Davis-Hammon opinion raised some concern, though, that
forfeiture doctrine might be construed so expansively as to subvert the
confrontation right. Imagine this exchange in a domestic violence case:
Prosecutor: Judge, the complainant is not going to come in to
testify at trial. I can tell you that, because of the way the accused has
abused her, she is terrified that he would harm her badly if she
testified against him at trial. So I ask you to hold that he has
547 U.S. 813 (2006).

Id. (No. 05-5705) (the Hammon case was argued in tandem with Davis).
The Indiana Supreme Court had recognized that the affidavit was testimonial,
but it contended that admission of the affidavit was harmless error given admission of
the oral accusation. State v. Hammon, 829 N.E.2d 444, 458-59 (2005).
Brief of Amici Curiae the Nat'l Network to End Domestic Violence, et al. in
Support of Respondents, Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No. 05-5224 and 05-5705).
2' Reply Brief of Petitioner Hershel Hammon at 19-20, Hammon v. Indiana, sub
nom. Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (No. 05-5705).
2o

2'

2'

Davis,547 U.S. at 832-33.

25

Id. at 833.
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forfeited the confrontation right and to admit the statements she
made to the arresting officer in her living room.
Judge: OK. Unless the defense gives me reason to conclude
otherwise, I'll find that more likely than not the accused
intimidated the complainant, and that she is therefore unavailable
as a result of his own wrongdoing. Accordingly, I'll hold that he has
forfeited the confrontation right.
Without deciding definitively, the Court's opinion contained broad
hints on two issues that made this scenario seem more likely-though I
do not believe that either of them addressed a means that could provide
satisfactory and realistic constraints on forfeiture doctrine.
First, the Court suggested that the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard would be constitutionally adequate to demonstrate forfeiture. 26
Prior opinions of the Court do suggest that this is the standard that the
Court would most likely adopt if it ever resolves the issue.27 I believe there
is considerable strength to the argument that a more stringent standard
should be applied. But I doubt that the issue matters all that much. I
suspect that if the Court said forfeiture required clear and convincing
evidence, most courts would make the requisite finding that the evidence
supporting forfeiture was clear and convincing.
Second, the Court noted that in determining whether there had
been a forfeiture, trial courts would presumably be allowed to consider
evidence not admissible on the merits. 28 That is in accordance with the
usual procedure on threshold questions, and it seems appropriate here.2 9
But if a judge can conclude on the basis of a preponderance of nonadmissible evidence that the accused has forfeited the confrontation
right, how might a scenario such as the one I have narrated be avoided? I
believe the only effective and appropriate way would be through a
doctrine of what I have called mitigation. The basic idea of mitigation is
this: Even though an accused has engaged in wrongful conduct that
presumptively rendered the witness unavailable to testify subject to
26

Id.

27

See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (adopting preponderance as

constitutionally required standard for determining voluntariness of confession).
During my argument in Hammon, the discussion turned towards forfeiture. Chief
Justice Roberts indicated that intimidation would be hard to prove. Justice Scalia,
presumably attempting to aid me, asked, "Well, you wouldn't have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt, would you?" Before I got very far in answering, he asked, "Couldn't
the judge just find it more likely than not that the defendant has intimidated a
witness?" I did not want to reject a lifeline, but neither did I want to concede that this
was the proper standard. So I answered, "Prior decisions of the Court suggest that
that would most likely be the-the standard." I started to say that conceivably the
Court could adopt a more demanding standard in this context, but the Chief Justice
asked a question about the method of proof, and the argument went on from there.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22-23, Hammon v. Indiana, sub. nom. Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (No. 05-5705).
28 Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
2 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
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confrontation, the state should not be able to invoke forfeiture doctrine
to the extent that it could have preserved the confrontation right in
whole or part by reasonable measures that were available to it but that it
forsook. If the state does forsake such measures, then it cannot be said
with sufficient clarity that the accused is the cause of his own inability to
examine the witness. This is analogous to the last clear chance doctrine
in torts: If the state has a good chance to preserve the confrontation
right, notwithstanding the accused's wrongdoing, it should take
advantage of that chance, rather than using the wrongdoing as a lever for
wiping out the confrontation right.
How the mitigation concept should be applied in given cases would
often be a matter of judgment. If the state claims that the accused
forfeited the confrontation right with respect to a given testimonial
statement by murdering the witness, but the witness lived for a
considerable time after making the statement, then arguably the right
should not be deemed forfeited if it would have been practical and
humane to take a deposition. In the Framing era, it was not unusual to
take the deposition of a dying victim in the presence of the suspect.30
If the allegedly forfeiting conduct was intimidation, then I believe
mitigation raises some very delicate issues. Should the court call the
witness in to chambers? Should it offer the anonymity of a witness
protection program? I do not have strong views on when, if ever, any one
of these measures should be adopted as prerequisites to a ruling of
forfeiture. But I believe that the courts should adopt some system of
required procedures, and that procedural hoops of this sort would be far
harder to evade than would some abstract evidentiary standard.
I have discussed some of the procedural questions surrounding
forfeiture doctrine. There are critical substantive questions as well. In
what settings should conduct by the accused that causes the witness to be
unavailable give rise to forfeiture? I have found over the years that many
people have an instinctive resistance to what I have called reflexive
forfeiture, the idea that forfeiture can be based on the same misconduct
for which the accused is being charged. And yet, as I have suggested,
careful, lawyerly analysis indicates that the proper answer to this
complexity is, "So what?"
For this reason, I believe that Dwayne Giles's lawyers, James Flanagan
and Marilyn Burkhardt, did a very clever thing when they presented his
case to the Supreme Court." They did not base their petition for
certiorari on the contention that forfeiture was inappropriate because of
a problem of circularity. Rather, they contended that forfeiture was

See, e.g., King v. Radbourne, I Leach 457, 168 Eng. Rep. 330 (Old Bailey 1787);
Rex v. Forbes, Holt 599, 171 Eng. Rep. 354 (1814); Rex v. Smith, Holt 614, 171 Eng.
Rep. 357 (1817).
Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
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inappropriate because there was no proof that Giles had murdered
Brenda Avie for the purposeof rendering her unavailable as a witness.
I remember a conversation with Jeff Fisher, who had argued for the
defendants in Crawford and Davis in the Supreme Court, while the Giles
petition was pending. Since before the Crawford decision, Jeff and I have
had an ongoing conversation on confrontation issues, some of them
immediately pending and some that we anticipate arising somewhere
down the road. Jeff comes at these issues from the point of view of a
defense lawyer. We agree on many things, but we disagree considerably
in our approach to forfeiture. He told me he hoped that the first
forfeiture case would not be a murder one. He wondered why I was eager
for the Court to take Giles, and I said that it was precisely for the reason
that it was a good, clean murder case. I thought the issues were much
more complex in intimidation cases; in a murder case, the Court would
find it virtually irresistible to conclude that the accused who had
murdered a witness had forfeited the confrontation right. Giles was a
relatively rare type of case in which, though the allegedly forfeiting deed
was murder, there could be no plausible contention that a dying
declaration exception applied. Obviously, the Court would not take a
case in which the outcome was clear, merely to decide whether it was
forfeiture or a dying declaration exception that warranted admissibility.
And so, even though I thought the decision below should be
affirmed, I put in a solo amicus brief urging the Court to review the
case, 33 and I was delighted when the Court granted certiorari. In fact, to
tell the truth, I was feeling pretty cocky when I got e-mail messages
congratulating me on the fact that the Supreme Court was taking my
suggestion. I assumed the Supreme Court would affirm the decision and
hold that a purpose to render the witness unavailable was not a
prerequisite for forfeiture. I wasn't alone; Linda Greenhouse, as savvy an
observer of the Court as there is, assumed the same thing.3 4 My
confidence was somewhat shaken when I saw the excellent amicus brief
submitted by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL) . The principal author was Robert Kry, who had clerked for
Justice Scalia when Crawford was decided. He is appropriately closemouthed as to whether he participated in drafting the opinion, but he
certainly has shown considerable interest in defending it. So I assumed
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-6053).
" Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for

32

Certiorari, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-6053).
34 See Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Hear Case Testing Rule on Witness,
N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2008, at A12. "It is ... likely that the justices accepted the new case, Giles v.
California, No. 07-6053, to make it clear that as long as the victim's unavailability as a

witness was a foreseeable consequence of the murder, the Sixth Amendment does not
require the state to prove the actual motive for the murder was to make the victim

unavailable."
'5 Brief of the Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-6053) [hereinafter NACDL Brief].
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he might have Justice Scalia's ear, and with it the ears of much of the
Court. But on the merits, I thought there were good counter-arguments,
and put in another solo amicus brief, this time in favor of the respondent
State.36 I was still feeling pretty confident.
That is, until the first 30 seconds or so of the oral argument, when
Justice Scalia did not jump down the throat of Giles' oral advocate,
Marilyn Burkhardt. The rest of the argument also gave me grave concern,
which was borne out in the end: only three justices-Stevens, Kennedy,
and Breyer-supported a holding of forfeiture absent a demonstration of
intent to render the witness unavailable.
As I see it, three arguments motivated the justices in the majority.
One was what Justice Souter, concurring, called "near circularity." This
one, to be candid, drives me up a wall. Focusing on the reflexive case,
Justice Souter wrote: "The only thing saving admissibility and liability
determinations from question begging would be (in a jury case) the
distinct functions ofjudge andjury .... 38
My reaction is that this is like saying that the only thing saving noon
from being dark is the sun. I have already given reasons why the
supposed circularity problem really isn't any problem at all. That should
have been obvious to all the justices.
Second was considerations of equity. But exactly what would be
inequitable about holding that a defendant who murders a witness
cannot complain about use of that witness's statement on the ground
that he did not have a chance to cross-examine her? "Let me get this
straight," the judge asks the candid defendant:
It's undisputed for purposes of this motion that the reason you
couldn't be confronted with the witness is that you killed her. And
it's equally clear that you intended to do so, and that you had no
justification in doing so. And it's also quite plain that when you
struck the fatal blow, ensuring that you killed rather than merely
wounded her, had you been thinking of consequences, it would
have been obvious that you were precluding the possibility that she
would come to court to testify against you. But your contention is
that you weren't thinking that way, and so your purpose wasn't to
render her unavailable, and therefore it would be unfair to hold
that you forfeited the confrontation right. No matter how evil your
purpose was, so long as it was not to prevent herfrom testifying in some
proceeding, it could not result in forfeiture. Do I have that right?
I believe there are some cases posing difficult questions as to
whether forfeiture is equitable. Suppose the defendant engages in legal
conduct that is designed to, and does, render the witness unavailablefriendly persuasion of a sibling, for example, or, in a more unusual case,
.% Brief of Richard D. Friedman as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for
Certiorari, Giles, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (No. 07-6053).
17
Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2694 (SouterJ., concurring in part).
38
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marrying the witness. A reckless but unintentional homicide makes an
interesting case. But murder? It does not strike me as a close call at all.
Finally, we come to history, the factor that dominated the lead
opinion by Justice Scalia. The basic argument, in the opinion and in the
briefs of Giles and the NACDL, takes as a premise that in the Framing era
and earlier there were no cases in which forfeiture was applied absent a
purpose to render the witness unavailable. The dying declaration
exception would have been essentially superfluous, the argument goes, if
forfeiture doctrine could be applied absent such a purpose; without such
a requirement, forfeiture would apply to virtually all dying declaration
cases and more because the dying declaration doctrine has an
imminence requirement while forfeiture does not.3 9 The NACDL and
Robert Kry take the argument further. They contend that forfeiture was
nothing but a basis for a determination of unavailability, and that it could
40
notjustify admission of a statement without cross-examination.
The argument, in both its basic and extended form, has been crafted
as if through a microscope: with meticulous care and precision but with
an unfortunately narrow focus. The argument is based on dicta and
boilerplate language in treatises, rather than on holdings of cases. Cases
fitting the mold of Giles simply were not presented in the Framing era.
The reason is that a case in that mold requires a testimonial statement
made before the crime being tried, and such a statement could only be
made and be relevant at trial if there was a continuing relationship
between the parties-but it was highly unlikely such a testimonial
statement would ever be made, because non-fatal domestic violence was
virtually never prosecuted.4'
In addition, the argument has a more significant failing. It does not
recognize that the dying declaration cases themselves, including their
imminence requirement, can easily be explained as applications of sound
forfeiture doctrine, bounded by a mitigation requirement, without a
need for demonstrating purpose to render the witness unavailable, and
without a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Suppose that in the
Framing era a victim of a grievous assault lingered for a time and
39

This assumes, as do I, that in most cases in which the dying declaration

doctrine is invoked, the court could make a (nearly circular?) predicate finding that
the accused committed the killing charged.
40 See NACDL Brief, supra note 35, at 5-6.
Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996), summarizes the law and practice: "The Anglo-American
4'

common law originally provided that a husband, as master of his household, could
subject his wife to corporal punishment or "chastisement" so long as he did not inflict

permanent injury upon her. During the nineteenth century,... authorities in
England and the United States declared that a husband no longer had the right to
chastise his wife. Yet, for a century after,.... [w]hile authorities denied that a

husband had the right to beat his wife, they intervened only intermittently in cases of
marital violence ...." See generally, e.g., SOCIETY FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF VICE, THE

CONSTABLE'S ASSISTANT (London, 2d ed. 1808) (manual giving no hint of the
existence of domestic violence).
HeinOnline -- 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 743 2009

LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:3

subsequently died. It was standard practice to take a formal, testimonial
statement from her. If death appeared to be imminent at the time, then
the statement could be admitted at the accused's murder trial,
• 42even
though the accused had not had an opportunity for confrontation. But
if death did not appear imminent at the time, then the statement was not
admissible unless the authorities provided the accused with an
opportunity for confrontation."
This set of holdings reflects very well a sound doctrine of forfeiture,
limited by a mitigation requirement, as I have articulated it above. Of
course, it was not generally expressed in those terms. Rather, the
language used was that which we have come to associate with the dying
declaration exception. But again, so what? Crawford was a great
achievement in part because it transformed the law so that it reflected
the principle expressed in the language of the Confrontation Clause. It is a
more demanding form of originalism to say that a doctrine must be
consistent with most of the results as of the time of the Framing-but the
account I have given satisfies that standard as well. It goes a step too far, a

step that I believe becomes a self-parody of originalism, to say that the
Clause demands that cases of a type never addressed in the Framing era

must be decided consistently with the rationales articulated in the
framing-era cases.
Use of this extended form of originalism is particularly ironic given
that Crawford itself explicitly did to recent cases precisely what I am saying
Giles should have done to older ones-it crafted a doctrine that was
consistent with the results of those cases even while rejecting the
rationale articulated in them.44 The rationales of framing-era cases are
entitled to even less deference, in part because the evidentiary law of the
42

See, e.g., King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 354 (Old Bailey

1789).

See Rex v. Forbes, Holt 599, 171 Eng. Rep. 354 (1814); Rex v. Smith, Holt 614,
171 Eng. Rep. 357 (1817); King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (Old
Bailey 1791); Thomas John's Case (1790), reported in 1 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE
OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 357-58 (photo. reprint 2006) (1803); Henry Welbourn's
Case (1792), reported in id. at 358-60. In Forbes, the accused was present for only part
of the deposition-and only that part was held admissible. In Smith, also, the accused
appeared when the proceeding was well under way-but the victim was re-sworn, the
testimony already given was read back, the victim reaffirmed it, and all was held
admissible.
THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (London 1801), presents
a nice juxtaposition, summarizing the law and showing the relation of the deposition
and dying declaration rules. On pages 40-41, Peake asserts that a deposition taken
under the so-called Marian statutes may be admitted at trial if the witness has died
and the accused was present, but that if the accused was not present the deposition
may not be admitted. A listing of Errata, p. xii, qualifies this by noting that the
statement may yet be admitted if the witness was "apprehensive of, or in imminent
danger of death."
"' See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 ("Although the results of our
41

decisions have generally been faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation
Clause, the same cannot be said of our rationales.").
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time was primitive and undeveloped. Edmund Burke said, with some
hyperbole, that a parrot could quickly be trained to recite the rules of
evidence in five minutes. I understand that we must pay respect to the
text of the Constitution, and to the principles that the text reflects, but
the Constitutional text contains no hint of the issues at stake in Giles. The
idea that, in deciding those issues, we are nevertheless bound by the
rationales of cases from that era that do not square with the facts of the
case currently being decided is quite startling to me.
It is a fair summary to say I don't like the decision in Giles. So, will it
do any harm? I think it will in several respects. And, another irony, I
think the result may well be that defendants come out worse as a result.
First, if the Court had decided the case under the theory I advocated,
then it would necessarily have adopted the principle of a mitigation
requirement. That would be enormously important. In domestic violence
cases, it would put pressure on prosecutors and other state officials to do
what they reasonably could to persuade the complainant to testify in a
manner preserving the confrontation right at least in part. In murder
cases in which the victim lingers for a considerable time, it would give the
state agents a strong incentive to take a deposition, unless it would be
unfeasible or inhumane. Perhaps the Court eventually will adopt a
mitigation requirement. As a matter of principle I believe it should do so,
but given the result in Giles, there is no momentum whatsoever in favor
of such a requirement.
Second, the decision in Giles will increase the temptation courts
already have to construe the key term "testimonial" too narrowly. One
can see this on the face of the Giles opinions itself. Justice Alito, who had
concurred in Hammon, expressed grave doubts as to whether Avie's
statement was testimonial, though he made no attempt at all to
46,
distinguish the cases. Presumably because no plausible distinction was
available. Perhaps even more troubling is a passage in the Court's
opinion. Responding to the dissent's contention that if forfeiture
doctrine were not confined by the incorporation of an intent
requirement it could be helpful in punishing domestic abusers, the
Court said that the doctrine would not be "as helpful as the dissent
suggests, since only testimonial statements are excluded by the
Confrontation Clause."47 And, the Court indicated, "Statements to friends
and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements Sto48
physicians in the course of receiving treatment," are not testimonial.
Wow. Did the Court really mean to determine so casually that, say, if a
victim makes an accusation to a physician, knowing that the physician will
relay the accusation to the police in fulfillment of a statutory duty to do
so, the accusation is not testimonial so long as there is some therapeutic
'5 12 WILLIAM HOLDSwORTH, A HIsToRYOF ENGLISH LAw 509 n.7 (1938).
46 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2694 (Alito,J., concurring).
:7

Id. at 2692 (majority opinion).
2692-93.

46 Id. at
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aspect to their meeting? I hope not. I hope the Court's statement will be
treated as obiter dictum. But it certainly indicates the extra incentive that
Giles creates to construe the term "testimonial" very narrowly.
Third, and similarly, the decision will increase the temptation to
construe the dying declaration exception more broadly. The recent
Jensen case is a prime example. 9 Mark Jensen was tried for the murder of
his wifeJulie.'0 A key piece of evidence was a letter written byJulie several
weeks before her death and to be opened in the event of her death.
Before the Supreme Court took the Giles case, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in an opinion .1thought was basically well reasoned, held that
there was sufficient evidence to conclude that Mark had forfeited the
confrontation right with respect to the letter by killing Julie. 5' After the
grant of certiorari, the trial judge predicted correctly (to my chagrin)
that the decision in the Giles case would render the forfeiture theory
untenable in the Jensen case. By that time, the trial was well under way,
and the letter had been admitted. So the judge, quite remarkably in my
view, held that the letter was a dying declaration. 2 Say what? It was
written while Julie was perfectly fit, without any imminent threat of death.
The theory the judge first enunciated was that the letter did not speak
until the moment of death. That, it seems to me, would make it not a
dying declaration but a dead declaration. Apparently recognizing the
problem, the judge filed a formal opinion stating a different theory, that
the letter could be withdrawn until the moment of death, so it spoke as of
the time immediately before. 3 The principal problem with that theory is
that there is no good basis for concluding that there was ever a time at
which Julie both realized that death was imminent and was in a position
to withdraw the letter. Plainly, the impulse to admit a statement like
Julie's does not arise from the existence of the dying declaration
exception; rather, it arises from recognition of the fact that Mark should
not be able to require exclusion of her statement on the ground that he
had no opportunity to cross-examine her if his wrongdoing rendered
such an opportunity impossible. Anticipating that Giles would preclude
this sensible theory, the trial judge manipulated the dying-declaration

'9State v.Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. 2007).
'oId. at 521.
" Id. at 536. That I thought the opinion was basically well reasoned may be
related to the court's statement that "in a post-Crawford world the broad view of
forfeiture by wrongdoing espoused by Friedman and utilized by various jurisdictions
since Crawfords release is essential." Id. at 535.
12 Links to a recording of the oral opinion and
argument related to it may be
found in the commentary to my post "If anything happens to me
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2008/03/if-anything-happens-to-me.html

(Mar. 1, 2008).
5'Memorandum Regarding the Dying Declaration, State v. Jensen, No. 02 CF
0314 (Wis. Cir. Ct. April 7, 2008), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/
-rdfrdman/JensenDyingDec.pdf.
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exception to reach the same result. Other judges may well respond in a
similar way.
Fourth, the decision takes away a good basis for challenging the rule
of United States v. Owens, one of the most damaging decisions to the
Confrontation Clause on the books. 54 Owens held that it satisfies the
Clause to put the witness on the stand even though he has virtually no
memory of the event his prior statement describes.5 In that case, Foster,
a prison guard, was the victim of a brutal assault for which Owens was
charged. Foster had severely impaired memory because his head had
been bashed in during the assault. During an interval of relative lucidity,
he made a statement identifying Owens as the assailant. But at the time
of trial, he was able to remember virtually nothing. The idea that Owens
had a satisfactory opportunity for cross-examination is nearly ludicrous.
True, the attempt at cross may have revealed that Foster had a bad
memory as of the time of the trial. But surely the jury would likely-or at
least might plausibly-conclude that Foster's inability to remember at the
time of trial was a lingering effect of the assault, and that his prior
statement was not a product of faulty memory but rather an accurate
report made during a transient period when his damaged condition
allowed it. Whatever questions Owens was able to pose at trial would do
little or nothing to undermine the persuasive impact of Foster's
statement-even if in fact the statement was based on an inaccurate
perception or reflected mere speculation by Foster. But, though the
holding that Owens had an adequate opportunity to examine Foster is
unfortunate and unjustified, the result of the case can easily be defended.
There was ample evidence that Owens had been the assailant and
therefore that his wrongdoing was the cause of his inability to examine
Foster. Owens therefore could easily be held to have forfeited the right to
be confronted with Foster-that is, if Giles had not incorporated a
purpose requirement into forfeiture doctrine. But, given that
requirement, this explanation for Owens is no longer a possibility because
there was no evidence that Owens assaulted Foster for the purpose of
preventing him from testifying at trial.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Giles undercuts the basic
theory of the Confrontation Clause. If Giles had come out the other way,
then the doctrine of the Clause might have been quite simple:
Prosecution testimony must be subject to an opportunity for
confrontation, at trial if reasonably possible, but the right might be
waived or forfeited. But now there clearly is a dying declaration
exception to the confrontation right-an exception that probably made
little sense on its own terms at the time of the Framing, that makes even
less sense now, and that does not square at all with the theory of Crawford.
Will the Court hold fast to the line that this exception, bizarre as it is, is

55

484 U.S. 554 (1988).
Id. at 559.
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the only one, sui generis on historical grounds? Perhaps, but I wonder. I
worry about long term corrosion of the Clause.
And in the end, I wonder how closely the courts will adhere to the
restrictive aspect of Giles. I suspect that over time courts will seize
aggressively the rather generous opening provided by the opinions of the
justices in the majority and find that the intent requirement is virtually
per se satisfied in a case of domestic violence. Both Justice Scalia's
opinion for the Court and Justice Souter's concurrence, joined by Justice
Ginsburg, emphasized the presumed intent of the abuser "to isolate the
victim.
At least to the two concurring justices-who were crucial to
form a majority-this presumed intent appears to be sufficient to support
a finding of the intent that is necessary for a holding of forfeiture: intent
to render the witness unavailable to testify in court. That approach leads
to sound results, but the logic is shaky. The essence of the Court's
decision is that forfeiture is proper only if unavailability results from
conduct that was designed to render the witness unavailable; that the
defendant knew or should have known that this would be the result does
not suffice. 57 But intent to isolate the victim is very diffuse. Even if one
could say that this intent was a primary factor motivating the abuser's
conduct, which is hardly universally self-evident, it is a stretch to jump
from that premise to the conclusion that the abuser was motivated by the
particular desire to render the victim unavailable as a witness. And when
the abuser murders the victim, the problem is compounded. True, as
Justice Souter wrote, "it would make no sense to suggest that the
oppressing defendant miraculously abandoned the dynamics of abuse
the instant before he killed his victim, say in a fit of anger."5 8 But the
accused who, having engaged in a longstanding abusive relationship,
then kills his victim has clearly undergone a change of intent. It trivializes
the act of murder to say that it is intended to "isolate" the victim, and
thus to infer-absent particularized evidence-that the accused was
motivated by a desire to render the victim unavailable as a witness.
It may be in the end that the internal inconsistencies in Giles will be a
partial saving grace of the decision, limiting the damage that the decision
causes because trial courts in domestic violence cases can avoid it simply
by reciting the "isolate the victim" rationale. But the permanent damage

5
See Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2693 ("Where ...an abusive relationship culminates in
murder, the evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to
isolate the victim and to stop her from reporting abuse to the authorities or
cooperating with a criminal prosecution-rendering her prior statements admissible
under the forfeiture doctrine.") (majority opinion), and at 2695 ("[Tlhe element of
intention would normally be satisfied by the intent inferred on the part of the
domestic abuser in the classic abusive relationship, which is meant to isolate the
victim from outside help, including the aid of law enforcement and the judicial
process.") (Souter,J., concurring in part).
5' See id. at 2688 (majority opinion) (rejecting the dissent's contention "that
knowledge is sufficient to show intent.").
5' Id. at 2695 (Souter,J., concurring in part).
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to the structure of Confrontation Clause doctrine will not be easily
remedied.
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